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AN UNCERTAIN PENALTY: A LOOK AT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
INABILITY TO HARMONIZE THE LAW




S the global economy rapidly expands and cross-border commer-
cial contracts proliferate, the need to establish harmony between
legal systems has never been a more pressing issue. It is trouble-
some when legal systems are so philosophically divided as to actually im-
pede the free flow of goods and services between countries. When
nations lack ideological uniformity, the economic actors working within
their legal frameworks face uncertainty. This leads to a reduction in their
willingness to enter contracts if their potential liabilities are vague or the
transaction costs of dealing with these ambiguities are raised. As it cur-
rently stands, both civil and common law systems have developed a ro-
bust scheme of contract law and have gradually merged to a consensus on
many important issues regarding contract. But, to date, there is still a
wide gulf between the two systems' approach to the enforceability of liq-
uidated damages and penalty clauses. It is of extreme importance to in-
ternational commerce to determine the extent to which these clauses
should be enforceable'
This paper aims to clarify the reasons that the international regime has
thus far failed to agree on a consensus approach to liquidated damages
and penalty clauses. These provisions make frequent appearances in a
wide array of international trade contracts, but, to date, no binding con-
vention or universally accepted standard has emerged to deal with them.
This paper will begin by giving a historical and philosophical analysis of
these clauses, it will then give a brief treatment to the pros and cons of
their enforceability, and lastly, the focus of the paper will be to give a
detailed breakdown of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) attempt at international unification through
1. Unless parties have explicitly provided for a choice of law clause in their contracts
and are aware of what the corresponding conflicts of law rules will be, there is
great uncertainty as to the legal treatment of a prearranged sum should one of the
parties breach.
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the adoption of a convention or model law. It is hoped that through a
thorough examination of the working group's discussions, concerns and
various drafts, the reader can obtain some insight as to why the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) was
unable to create a harmonized standard for the treatment of liquidated
damages and penalty clauses.
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
It is a well settled point of law that courts and tribunals are to give
effect to the freely consented will of contracting parties as evidenced by
their intentions in a contract.2 Courts do not investigate whether a bar-
gain is a good one unless vitiating factors are present, such as duress,
fraud, and the like. 3 The issue of penalty clauses and liquidated damages
is atypical in that the legality of these bargained for agreements varies
widely by jurisdiction, and the rationale for their disparate treatment is
based on fundamentally different ideological stances on their utility vis-A-
vis social harm.4
It is a fairly safe generalization to say that civil law countries will give
legal effect to a clause stipulating that a prearranged sum will be paid
upon breach even when that sum is used solely as a coercive mechanism. 5
In common law countries it is likewise safe to make the generalization
that a court will not enforce an agreement for one party to pay a prear-
ranged sum in the event of breach if that sum was not meant to be a bona
fide pre-estimate of the likely amount of damages.6
When discussing these clauses, it is important first to understand what
they are and what they are not. Often, one hears the terms 'penalty' and
'liquidated damages clauses' used interchangeably, but they do have im-
portant differences. Both penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses
initially serve the same function: they are a pre-arrangement between
contracting parties stipulating that, in the event of breach, the breaching
party (the obligor) will pay an agreed upon sum-or a formula to arrive
at a sum-to the non-breaching party (the obligee). Where penalty
clauses differ from liquidated damages clauses, however, is that the pur-
pose of a penalty clause is not to attempt to pre-estimate the possible
damage that breach might cause the obligee, but rather it is used as a
mechanism where a breach will cause such an oppressive burden upon
2. Larry DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated
Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J., 633, 641 (2001) ("The private bargaining paradigm is
premised on the belief that a contract represents the mutual assent of the
parties.").
3. KEVIN Hoy, STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: PENALTIES AND LIQUI-
DATED DAMAGES CLAUSES IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 232 (Dennis Campbell
Ed., 1996).
4. A discussion of penalty clauses' social (dis)utility will be taken up in further detail
on page 8.
5. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated damages and
penalty clauses, [1979] 10 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/161.
6. Id.
AN UNCERTAIN PENALTY
the obligor that he will be coerced to complete performance-even if
breach would be more efficient or desirable to him.7
Through the common law lens, an unenforceable penalty exists when
the amount to be paid is extravagant "in comparison with the greatest
loss that could conceivably flow from the breach." Case law has articu-
lated that if a clause "is intended by the parties to operate in lieu of per-
formance, it will be deemed a liquidated damages clause and may be
enforced by the courts... [but] if such a clause is intended to operate as a
means to compel performance, it will be deemed a penalty and will not be
enforced." 9
U.S. jurisprudence is influenced greatly by, and mirrors, the UCC and
the Restatement. 10 Prearranged sums payable in the event of breach are
not per se illegal in the United States. But, whether American courts will
enforce a predetermined sum is dependent on two prongs: (1) that the
stipulated amount was genuinely intended to compensate the non-
breaching party; and (2) the loss caused by the breach is impossible or
difficult to quantify, making it hard to get an adequate remedy any other
way. UCC §2-718 reads in pertinent part: "(1) Damages for breach by
either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by
the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-
feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."'" The same sec-
tion then states in no uncertain terms that "[a] term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.' 12
The UCC view on the legality of penalties seems to be a reflection of
one of the key doctrines of U.S. contract law that was articulated in 1881
by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he said "[t]he only universal conse-
quence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor
7. For a description of a penalty clause, see Hoy, supra note 3, at 244-45 (Describing
a penalty clause as: "A sum which, by the terms of a contract made between A
and B, A agrees to pay B in the event of non performance by A of one or more of
A's obligations under the contract with B, and which is not a genuine pre-estimate
of the damage which is likely to be suffered by B in the event of such breach."
(Citing ECGD vs. Universal Oil Products Company [1983] 2 All ER 205)).
8. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre co Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co Ltd, [1915] AC 79.
An example of when a common law court found there to be extravagance was in
the 1850's British case Betts v. Burch where a clause fixing damages at in relation
to any breach of a furniture and stock sale agreement was deemed to be an unen-
forceable penalty because the amount of £50 applied to any and all breaches, even
miniscule ones that could under no circumstances have amounted to that amount
of damage (£50 in the 1850s was apparently a large sum). Part of the ruling seems
to be that the clause operated on a multiplicity of breaches, some of which would
not possibly rise to the stipulated amount. It seems if the clause were tailored
more specifically to the harm that may be experienced from any individual breach,
the court may have found it to be an enforceable liquidated damages clause. See
Betts v. Burch, 4 Hurl. & N. 506 (1859).
9. Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F.Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
10. Hoy, supra note 3, at 385-86.
11. U.C.C. §2-718 (2003) (emphasis added).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
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pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass."'13 Professor
Corbin has expounded on this philosophy by saying "justice requires
nothing more than compensation measured by the amount of harm suf-
fered."'1 4 Pursuant to this theory, a breaching party can choose to not
perform and pay only the expectancy damages to the aggrieved party.
Penalty clauses are thus abhorrent to common law courts because they
force an obligee to compensate more than the harm that was actually
experienced. 15
Excessive compensation contravenes another central precept of con-
tract law, that "an injured party should not be put in a better position
than had the contract been performed. ' 16 It should be briefly noted,
however, that common law courts occasionally do allow extra-compensa-
tory damages in contract as a punitive measure. Traditional contract law
has historically forbidden punitive awards for breach, but the modern in-
novation of the tort of bad faith breach has opened up limited instances
where punitive damages may be awarded.17 Such instances, however, do
not include mere opportunism, which is not seen as so egregious so as to
warrant punitive action against the breaching party. The tortious breach
must amount to something more morally outrageous like intentional mis-
representation, conversion, forgery, or tortious interference with business
relationships.1 8 The instances where tortious conduct merits a punitive
award for contract breach are thus narrowly construed. Other than in
these limited instances, common law judges almost never permit compen-
sation that exceeds the contractual harm experienced by the obligee and
they tend to mistrust any arrangement that might lead to his unjust
enrichment.
13. Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses
in Common and Civil Contract Law 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 386 (2002)
(quoting Holmes).
14. ARTHUR CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1057 (1964).
15. See In re Plywood Co. of Pa., 425 F.2d 151, 155 (3rd Cir. 1970) ("The criteria for
distinguishing liquidated damage clauses and penalty clauses are quite general. A
penalty is said to be fixed not as a 'pre-estimate of probable actual damages, but as
a punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach' . . . In addi-
tion, the liquidated damages stipulated must not be disproportionate to the proba-
ble loss judged as of the time of making the contract.").
16. Truck Rent-A-Center v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 424 (N.Y. 1977)
("A promisor would be compelled, out of fear of economic devastation, to con-
tinue performance and his promisee, in the event of default, would reap a windfall
well above actual harm sustained."); Hatzis, supra note 13, at 387. It should be
noted briefly that the idea of barring compensation above and beyond the harm
suffered seems inconsistent with the United States' willingness to enforce punitive
damages awards in tort actions. Many commentators puzzle over this contradic-
tion in American jurisprudence, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
in detail the history and policy motivations that underlie this apparent aberration.
For a further discussion of super-compensatory damages in contract, see John A
Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract;
Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565
(1986); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Dam-
ages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
17. DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 650.
18. Id. at 650 n.53.
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Besides the judicial apprehension towards unjust enrichment, common
law also finds it inappropriate for private litigants to punish each other-
retribution should be left exclusively to criminal tribunals. 19 Countries
with legal systems modeled after the Napoleonic Code, conversely, tend
to give full credence to the will of parties, even if the agreement has the
effect of punishment. Civilians see contract as a right that the court has
an obligation to enforce. These civil systems view penalty clauses as an
efficient way to encourage performance, which leads to more commercial
certainty and reduces the costliness of litigation to determine damages
after the fact.20 Furthermore, just as common law contract jurisprudence
demands that judges not evaluate the adequacy of consideration of the
parties, civilians generally do not see it as the judge's role to assess the
adequacy or fairness of the remedy prescribed by the agreement.2 '
The common law's judicial loathe for penalty clauses has a long history
in common law countries, but it has not always been the case that these
courts have shunned penalties. Up until at least the Seventeenth Cen-
tury, English courts enforced penal bonds, which were sealed instruments
that aimed to ensure performance by stipulating the payment of a sum of
money well in excess of the value of the contract itself (usually two times
the amount of the contract).2 2 As the jurisprudence developed over the
following centuries, English courts-and consequently all common law
19. Rattigan v. Commodore Intern. Ltd., 739 F.Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Al-
though freedom of contract is at the core of contract law, the "freedom to contract
does not embrace the freedom to punish, even by contract."); see also Discussion
Paper on Penalty Clauses 4 (Scottish L. Comm'n, Discussion Paper No. 103, 1997);
Note that common law tribunals do, however, often award punitive damages in
actions of tort. Discussion of this aberration is beyond the scope of this paper, but
it is fair to assert that common law countries-except in very limited circumstances
such as tortious breach-will not allow private litigants to enforce contractual pro-
visions that have the effect of punishing the obligor.
20. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5.
21. DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 643. Note, however, that judges are free to adjust pen-
alty causes downward if they are so excessive or if there are other extenuating
circumstances that would warrant a reduction. See C. Civ. art. 1152 (as amended
in 1975 and further amended in 1985) (Fr.) ("Nevertheless, the Judge may, even of
his own accord, reduce or increase the agreed-upon penalty if it is manifestly ex-
cessive or ridiculously small. Any contrary stipulations will be considered not writ-
ten."); Schweizerishches Obligationenrecht [OR], [Code of Obligations] art. 163
(Switz.) ("An excessively high penalty has to be reduced by the court, according to
its discretion") Burgerliches Gesetzburch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 343 (F.R.G.) ("If a
forfeited penalty is disproportionally high, the court may upon the obligor's re-
quest reduce it to an appropriate amount. In determining the question of what is
appropriate, every rightful interest of the obligee, not only his monetary interest,
has to be considered") (Note that under German law, judicial modification is not
permitted in contracts where the obligor is a merchant, presumably these parties
should be sophisticated enough to caution against oppressive clauses-§ 348 of the
German Commercial Code says a "contractual penalty promised by a merchant in
the course of his business cannot be reduced"); See also Report of the Secretary-
General, supra note 5 (that judicial neutrality is limited in the event that the pen-
alty clause has a gross or excessive disparity from harm. Only then is some judicial
adjustment is allowed. Judges are also given leeway to adjust a penalty down if
there has been partial performance, it offends good morals, it is contrary to good
faith or unjustly enriches the other party).
22. Hatzis, supra note 13, at 384.
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courts-gradually began striking these types of onerous provisions on
public policy grounds, positing that their enforcement was unreasonable
because weak parties must have lacked sufficient bargaining power. 23 To
this day, U.S. courts retain this vestige of common law paternalism to-
wards the perceived inequitable bargaining power that must have oc-
curred for parties to have entered into these types of arrangements.
24
The United States has held fast to this view in spite of the criticism of
many commentators, and despite the apparent success of civil law courts
treating penalties liberally. Civilians believe that unless the sum is seri-
ously inequitable, it should not be inquired into for legitimacy.
25
B. EFFICIENT BREACH OR INCREASED RELIANCE?
Though protection of weak parties was the initial motivation to strike
down penalty clauses, as case law matured in common law countries, a
less paternalistic rationale was invoked as a reason for the non-enforce-
ment of these clauses. Economists lauded the principal of "efficient
breach," where, as the theory goes, if parties are free to break their bar-
gains should a better deal come along, rational actors will breach their
first contract, pay the expectancy damages to the obligee, and pursue the
more lucrative alternative. Presumably, this will have a net benefit to
society because resources are being channeled to the user who values
them most.
For instance, assume the following scenario: Acme Contractors agrees
to build an office building for Fred Firstbuyer for an agreed price of
$100,000 to be completed by August 31st. Acme Contractors is about to
begin work on the office building but is subsequently approached by Ivan
Interloper who offers to pay Acme $200,000 if they will build him a home
by August 31st. Since Acme is a small company-it lacks the personnel
23. DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 643-44 (These clauses were not stricken because of the
traditional notion of unconscionability-the unconscionability doctrine requires
both substantive and procedural unconscionability-whereas "the law of liqui-
dated damages allows a court to void an express term [solely] upon [a] finding of
unreasonableness. No procedural shortcomings need be shown to invalidate a liq-
uidated damages clause").
24. DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 645. DiMatteo cites P.S. Atiyah who concluded that
courts voided these provisions under the fictions of fraud and mistake. Atiyah
believes that courts presume unequal results must have been the result of unfair
procedures. Atiyah states: "our natural reaction is to believe that something must
have gone wrong with the bargaining process. How could a rational person have
entered into this contract if he ... had not been subject to undue pressures, or the
like?" Id.
25. Hatzis. supra note 13, at 385. See also C. Civ. art. 1152 (Fr.) (Note that up until
1975, the French Civil Code did not provide for any judicial scrutiny and modifica-
tion except under art. 1231 which allowed judicial modification if there had been
partial performance-but even the protection of art. 1231 could be stipulated away
by the obligor. In 1975, Article 1152 was amended to allow judicial modification
both up and down if the sum is "manifestly excessive or ridiculously low." In 1985,
Article 1231 was also amended so that parties could not stipulate away judicial
modification for partial performance. For both articles, any agreement to the con-
trary would be stricken and that part of the contract would be read as if it were
never written).
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to build both buildings concurrently-it might rationally decide to break
its contract with Fred to take the more lucrative contract from Ivan. Of
course, Fred would be very upset, he may have planned to relocate his
business on August 31st, so now he must find another contractor and also
possibly rent space for his employees and office equipment due to the
delay in getting a new contractor to build the office. All these expenses
will cost Fred $50,000 in addition to the $110,000 he must pay to cover the
cost of a new contractor on short notice. What is Acme to do? A ra-
tional actor (leaving aside reputation costs) would clearly breach this con-
tract if the only penalty that may befall him is $160,000.26 Acme has
netted about $40,000, Ivan has a new home, Fred got his office-albeit
late-but all parties are happy more or less. Right? It seems that the
legal structure under the common law which only allows Fred to recover
his expectancy damages would encourage this type of opportunistic be-
havior by Acme.
Economists would laud this allocation of resources to a higher valued
user by arguing that it was efficient for Acme to breach and society as a
whole is better off if the user who places a higher value on a good is able
to obtain it. Had the civil system been in place, this transaction may very
well have never occurred. Had this been a jurisdiction where penalty
clauses were enforceable, Fred might have stipulated that in the event of
a breach, Acme is to pay Fred $250,000. Assuming Acme agreed to this,
once Ivan approached Acme with his offer of $200,000, Acme would not
be so quick to breach with Fred. Not only would Acme be foregoing the
$100,000 payment from Fred, but it would be liable to pay him $250,000.
Thus the $200,000 offered by Ivan no longer looks as attractive, and
Acme would probably begrudgingly finish the office for Fred while
watching his sub-par competitor, Beta Contractors, get Ivan's deal.
On first blush, the outcome under the civil system seems suboptimal;
resources are not being used to their maximum ability. But what in fact is
NOT apparent under the common law system is very important. Presum-
ably, Fred, cognizant of the fact that Acme might walk away at any time
should a better deal present itself, has retained a backup contractor for a
retainer fee of $15,000, or has otherwise taken out an insurance policy to
protect him against the months a building delay would cost due to seek-
ing cover for a new contractor. He may have even put down a deposit on
a new office building so he could move in on short notice should Acme
bail out. These transaction costs are not fully appreciated in the efficient
breach hypothesis but are very important as an obligee must in some way
insure himself from risk ex ante, lest he find himself scrambling to find an
alternative ex post.
Under the civil system, however, where Fred's onerous $250,000 fee for
breach might seem to prevent Acme from allocating its resources to a
higher paying buyer, in fact it is possibly a cheaper way for Fred to insure
26. Figures are not including attorney's fees.
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himself against the risk of Acme breaching. 27 Should Acme be ap-
proached by Ivan's more attractive offer, Acme would want to renegoti-
ate with Fred to possibly lower the penalty to an acceptable level where
Acme and Fred could both share the gains from the better deal and maxi-
mize their collective utility. They could agree to lessen the penalty to
$175,000 so both might profit $25,000 from the deal with Ivan. Fred can
then more easily afford cover, Acme has still made a nice profit, and Ivan
is happy to have his home built by the best contractor in the city.28 This
prevents the outcome in common law systems, where all the spoils go to
the opportunistic Acme. 29
Under the common law system, the original policy of the court was to
protect a party from agreeing to an onerous term, but in a perverse way,
this paternalism may have in fact created an exploitative actor who is
taking all the gains of a better deal and leaving an innocent party to
scramble for substitute performance. The civil system, though admittedly
with its own transaction costs-renegotiation could be contentious-
seems better at splitting the spoils should a better option come along.
Aside from the obvious benefits of increased certainty of performance
and cheaper litigation to determine damages under the civil law rule, the
reallocation of the proceeds of a superior option should not be
understated.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at length whether en-
forcement or non-enforcement of these clauses leads to a better societal
outcome-this issue has been addressed by a number of scholars-but
what is important for the purposes of this paper is to highlight that there
is a vigorous debate about the issue, and that the best approach is not
apparent.30 What is clear, though, is that the international economy
would be much better off if it adopted a harmonized approach. As it
27. Presumably, if Fred desired the contract so much so as to mandate an extracom-
pensatory clause payable by Acme, then performance is of special value to Fred.
Accordingly, it is also likely that-assuming equal bargaining power-Acme
would demand a higher payment price in return for the increased liability they
face. This fee is the insurance that Fred is willing to pay Acme rather than to a
third party. Seeking third party insurance would probably be more expensive after
factoring transaction costs etc.
28. See, generally, Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (For an argument that
penalty clauses lead to a lessening of transaction costs, Professors Goetz and Scott
argue that the performing party is the most efficient insurer. A penalty clause is
like insurance that the obligee is willing to pay a premium for. If a penalty clause
is not allowed, the obligee will have to take inefficient precautions such as
purchase third party insurance).
29. Notions of equity would also support the idea that the opportunistic party is in a
way "bad" and this type of behavior should be discouraged if "innocent" parties
like Fred don't get to share in the opportunity.
30. For a more thorough discussion, see generally DiMatteo, supra note 2; Scott &
Goetz, supra note 28; Hatzis, supra note 13; and Ugo Mattei, The Comparative
Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1995)
(for examples of scholarly material on the relative efficiencies of the civilian v.
common law approach).
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currently stands, the lack of standardization has led to, and will continue
to cause, uncertainty and inefficiency in international commerce.
II. INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION?
The idea to create a worldwide standard is not new. The international
community has tried for decades to develop some form of a unified treat-
ment on liquidated damages and penalty clauses. In 1979, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) sought
to develop either some form of binding convention, uniform model law,
or general conditions to be applied in international trade contracts re-
garding these types of clauses. It was not the first time that an interna-
tional body has tried to create a universal standard regarding liquidated
damages and penalty clauses.
A. REGIONAL ATTEMPTS AT UNIFICATION
In 1978, the Committee of Ministers for the Council of Europe pub-
lished a report on penalty clauses which recommended the member states
to take into consideration the principles in their Resolution when the
member states' governments prepare new legislation on the subject. 3 1
Also, in 1973 a regional convention was entered into by the member
states of Benelux.32 UNCITRAL, however, wanted to expand the scope
of application beyond limited regional trade organizations, and they
31. Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Penal Clauses in Civil Law res.
(78)3) (Jan. 20, 1978). The principles embodied in the resolution discuss the extent
to which these clauses should be enforceable. The text of the resolution is re-
printed at the end of this paper in Annex 1. For a detailed analysis of the Resolu-
tion, see DiMatteo supra note 2, at 654. According to DiMatteo, among the most
important points in the Resolution, the issue of judicial adjustment of penal
clauses was discussed. He claims the Council adopted language similar to that
used in the doctrine of unconscionability. It allows for judicial control over penal
clauses "where the penalty is manifestly excessive." The Resolution provided a list
of factors to determine whether a clause is manifestly excessive. The factors in-
clude: "the comparison of the pre-estimated damages with the actual damages
suffered, the legitimate interests of the parties including the promisee's non-pecu-
niary interests, the category of the contract and the circumstances under which it
was concluded, in particular the relative social and economic positions of the par-
ties ... or the fact that the contract was a standard form contract, and whether the
breach was in good or bad faith." DiMatteo argues that "manifestly excessive" is
synonymous with substantive unconscionability and the factors for reviewing liqui-
dated damages mirror the methods for determining procedural unconscionability
such as looking at the relative social and economic position of the parties and the
use of standard form contracts.
32. The Interparlimentary Consultative Council of Benelux attempted to create a con-
vention between its member states Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg relat-
ing to penal clauses. The convention was done at the Hague on November 26,
1973. The convention did not really address in any significant way the legality of
penal clauses, but instead primarily focused its attention to the administrative de-
tails of the clauses, such as the statute of limitations on its collection and order of
preference for creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Note that as of the time of
writing by UNCITRAL to create a worldwide standard in 1979, the Benelux Con-
vention had not yet entered into force. The annex to the Convention, which con-
tains the substantive provisions ,is reprinted in Annex 2 at the end of this paper.
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wanted to make it so that the end result of their drafting would produce a
document that contained teeth. It hoped to establish a world-wide norm
that would actually unify the patchwork of national laws and facilitate
cross border trade.
In order to understand how the final draft of the proposed convention
or model law on liquidated damages and penalty clauses came to be, this
paper will chronologically analyze the various drafts and commentary
found in the official documents released by UNCITRAL. These docu-
ments are the best known evidence of the unfortunately sparse legislative
record that described the development of the (ultimately failed) harmoni-
zation attempt. The paper will first discuss the reasons UNCITRAL felt
this work was necessary and found the current system to be inadequate.
It will then try to elucidate why the work ultimately failed by combing
through the documentary record-uncovering the points of agreement
and, most importantly, those of contention. After an analysis of the legis-
lative record, hopefully the reader will have a better grasp of why the
attempt failed and what key issues should be considered and adjusted if,
and when, the international community decides to take up this important
work once again.
III. THE UNCITRAL ATTEMPT AT WORLDWIDE
UNIFORMITY
A. LAYING THE FOUNDATION
Before promulgating such an ambitious rule or law, the commission
initially had to inquire into the feasibility and also the necessity of estab-
lishing a generally accepted transnational norm-whether it would be a
helpful thing to do and whether logistically and ideologically it could be
accomplished. After a preliminary investigation, which included the con-
sultation of legal scholars and delegates from many states, it was deter-
mined that establishing a uniform law would be beneficial to the
furthering of international commerce.33 In their report from 1979, UN-
CITRAL discussed several of the reasons why such an undertaking was
33. Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
5; see also Report of the Secretary-General, Analysis of Expert Opinions, and Re-
plies to the Secretariat Questionnaire on Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses,
[1981] 12 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.33/ADD.1.
(The Secretariat solicited views of selected experts with experience in international
contract practices and it also circulated a questionnaire about the relevant issues to
the International Chamber of Commerce to distribute to its national committees
for comment). The questions asked included:
1. Are provisions inserted in international contracts for the payment of
liquidated damages or penalties for total or partial non-performance of
contracts (a) often? (b) occasionally? (c) never?
2. Have you encountered difficulties in agreeing upon the insertion of
such provisions in international contracts? Please give details.
3. If the answer to question 1 is either (a) or (b), in what kinds of inter-
national contracts are such provisions inserted?
4. For what types of non-performance (e.g. delay in performance, failure
to meet contract standards) are such provisions usually inserted, and
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helpful, if not necessary. It noted that: (1) pre-agreed sums serve a use-
ful purpose because they eliminate the costs of proving loss after breach
has occurred; (2) even if damages are awarded, after litigation costs,
awards might not be fully compensatory; (3) fixing sums at an amount
higher than that which the obligor would normally pay in the event of
breach exerts pressure on the obligor to perform on his obligations; and
(4) the amount serves to limit the liability of the obligor-if there is a
predetermined amount, the obligor can commit himself to less liability
than what the law of damages would otherwise prescribe, which allows
the obligor to know what his maximum exposure to damages may be.
34
UNCITRAL went on to describe how the necessity for certainty of
liability was especially acute in the context of international trade: "[a]
plaintiff who has to establish his loss in a foreign court may incur consid-
erable expense, and also be uncertain as to the extent of his recovery."
35
The commission reasoned that allowing parties to arrange for this ahead
of time would significantly decrease litigation costs and keep foreign par-
ties from having to prove damages in unfamiliar legal systems and in far-
away forums. Furthermore, if the pre-agreed sum did in fact coerce
performance, this might be desirable since states with planned economies
lack the thick markets necessary to find substitute performance should a
party breach. In such circumstances, the assurance of performance has a
what are the special advantages of such provisions for those types of non-
performance?
5. Have you encountered any difficulties in the application or enforce-
ment of such provisions in international contracts? Please give details.
In particular, have liquidated damages or penalties (a) been declared
void? (b) been reduced by Courts or arbitral tribunals?
6. Would the drawing up of a uniform law applicable to international
contracts and reducing the difficulties which arise in the use of such pro-
visions be worthwhile?
7. Are there any approaches, other than the drafting of a uniform law,
which might reduce the difficulties currently encountered by parties in
the use of liquidated damages and penalty clauses (e.g. the drawing up of
guidelines to assist parties wishing to use a liquidated damages or penalty
clause)?
8. Are there any other observations you wish to make?
34. Report of the Secretary-General.- liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra
note 5, at 40-41; see also Working Paper submitted to the Working Group on Inter-
national Contract Practices at its second session, [1981] 12 Y.B. Int'l Trade Comm'n
39, AICN.9/WG.2/WP.33 (These working papers expanded upon the reasons that a
predetermined sum might be used. They noted that the model rules should cover
all types of contracts, because they aren't limited to specific genres of trade, but
rather are useful for various circumstances, where, for instance: the breach itself of
the main obligation was easy to prove; some industries had developed expected
norms for liquidating damages such as set schedules for delay in construction con-
tracts; proof of the actual loss might be costly or difficult; the breach of the main
obligation isn't so serious as to make the parties want to end their relationship with
each other-but rather a penalty for delay would better ensure an ongoing rela-
tionship; there was a need to limit the liability to the obligor in the event of breach;
there are instances where the obligee really prefers to receive performance and not
damages for breach-for instance if the obligee places idiosyncratic subjective
value on performance).
35. Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
5, at 41.
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huge benefit. 36
Of course much of this uncertainty could be resolved without a unified
law on damage clauses if the parties stipulate ahead of time what their
choice of governing law will be. If for instance, a Chilean supplier of
component parts and a French toy manufacturer stipulate that in the
event that the Chilean supplier fails to deliver the parts, such breach will
be penalized by a sum that exceeds the damages that could conceivably
be suffered. If the parties agree to be bound by U.K. law, then they can
be fairly certain that any penalty clause they have agreed to will not be
enforced by the British Court. Conversely, if they stipulate that the law is
to be governed by French law, they can both be fairly certain that the
penalty clause will be upheld.37 The only problem is that parties do not
always stipulate what law will govern, or sometimes the choice of law
clause is such a contentious issue that raises transaction costs im-
mensely-often leading to the parties entering a stalemate and not agree-
ing to a choice of law clause at all. It is in these instances that unification
of legal systems would be crucial. 38 If parties fail to stipulate ahead of
time which law is to prevail, they will not be certain what damages might
befall them should one of the parties not perform. Even if the parties
think that they will be saved by the default framework that the UN Con-
vention on the Contract for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) pro-
vides, they will be disappointed to learn that the CISG does not really
address this issue. 39
CISG article 4(a) defines the scope of the convention, and states that it
is not "concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or any of its provi-
sions or of any usage."' 40 Unfortunately for the parties, the CISG leaves a
large gap as to the enforceability of the provisions themselves. As such,
even though states may be signatories to the CISG, the commercial actors
within their borders conducting international trade will not have their liq-
uidated damages and penalty clauses evaluated under this convention.
What the parties are then left with is the uncertain and unstandardized
hodgepodge of domestic laws, bilateral trade agreements, and individual
states' choice of law rules. Absent some concerted unification on this
36. Bear in mind that this rationale would have been much more important then than
now as Socialist States were far more numerous and wielded much more relative
economic power. Even with the exponential growth of trade with China in recent
decades, there is probably a much more robust market to obtain cover than in
1970's Soviet Russia.
37. Barring some other type of circumstance such as partial performance or an agree-
ment for a manifestly excessive sum.
38. "Express selection of a law to govern the contract would mitigate these uncertain-
ties where the lex fori recognizes the applicability of the selected law to determine
the effect of such clauses, and does not apply its own rules on the basis of public
policy. However, there may be no express selection of a law or, even if there is,
the lex fori may be undetermined." Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated
damages and penalty clauses, supra note 5, at 46.
39. The CISG is actually a part of all the signatories' domestic law as it is a binding
treaty, but it fails to adequately address the treatment of penalty clauses.
40. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), art. 4(a) (1980).
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topic, the parties will be forced to concur upon the governing law and its
accompanying conflicts treatment or face uncertainty as to the legal effect
of their agreed sum.
UNCITRAL concluded its 1979 report with the observation that policy
differences needed to be reconciled between the common and civil law
countries before any sort of unification was possible. The commission
noted the difficulty of this task would be by highlighting that the policy
grounds, which underlie each system's rule, are based upon cherished le-
gal ideologies. They noted that the "[d]ifferences as to the grounds of
public policy which invalidate penalty clauses would be difficult to har-
monize, since the grounds adopted by each legal system would be based
on values of special importance to it. ' 41
The commission did not attempt to mask its agenda of making penalty
clauses enforceable in international trade contracts. UNCITRAL seems
to have clearly favored their enforceability, and it was keen to chip away
at the common law's reticence to enforce these clauses. Despite the ideo-
logical divide between the two legal traditions, the commission was opti-
mistic that the two systems could still overcome their differences. It
noted that since prearranged sums are not per se illegal in common law
systems-if the commission was able to apply some restrictions to the
availability of these clauses, it might be able to appease the concerns of
common law courts. UNICTRAL hypothesized that a way to get com-
mon law countries on board would be to qualify their use by possibly
"restricting the application of the rules to international contracts, contin-
uing to apply existing rules protecting a weaker contracting party against
fraud and coercion and, in particular, making the unified rules applicable
only upon express selection by the parties. 4
2
B. ANALYZING THE PROCESS
Though it may be a bit tedious, it seems the best way to elucidate the
major snags to international unification is to go through the drafting pro-
cess of the model rules themselves to observe how the parties involved
framed the issues and how they perceived the potential hurdles-and so-
lutions to such hurdles. Through a chronological analysis, it can be seen
how the rules were drafted, discussed, and ultimately distilled to the lan-
guage that actually appeared in the draft UN convention. By looking at
its development, one can understand which issues were the most conten-
tious and hopefully one can identify those concerns that have prevented
uniformity from being achieved nearly three decades later.
43
41. Report of the Secretary-General: liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
5, at 47 (emphasis added). It is not clear if the differing legal systems actually hold
dissimilar values or whether they simply hold dear to different techniques to pro-
tect their similar values.
42. Id.
43. It is a difficult question to answer exactly why there is no unified standard roughly
thirty years after UNCITRAL determined to address this issue in 1979. Unfortu-
nately, there is little on the record between the parties who attempted to adopt a
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Subsequent to the initial statement by UNCITRAL in 1979 that it
wished to establish a uniform international standard, meetings were held
by a working group to try to iron out the specifics of what would hope-
fully be either a treaty or, at a minimum, a model law that would actually
lead to adoption by the individual member states' legislatures. In the fol-
lowing pages there will be a breakdown of the points of agreement and
disagreement of the working group. These will hopefully frame the main
issues of concern and disagreement between the scholars and member
states involved in the drafting.
IV. UNCITRAL DRAFTING SESSIONS: THE ISSUES
ARE DEBATED
A. FEBRUARY 1981 WORKING GROUP FINDINGS
1. Points of Agreement of the Working Group
In a working Paper by the Working Group on International Contract
Practices from April 1981, UNCITRAL first tried to establish the scope
of the finished document. 44 They determined that it was crucial to treat
both penal clauses and liquidated damages similarly. Often it was diffi-
cult to determine the purpose of the clause until after the fact when dam-
ages were to be determined. The working group reasoned that:
in many cases, the sum of money to be paid on breach was not de-
scribed in the contract as either penal or compensatory, and determining
whether the sum fell into one or the other category would often be diffi-
cult, and sometimes impossible when parties intended the sum to be both
penal and compensatory. Indeed parties do not always clearly distinguish
the two concepts.45
convention on this matter, and there is also essentially no scholarly commentary
outside of the UN documents themselves discussing why the UNCITRAL's at-
tempt at unification was not a success. What is known from the little documentary
evidence is that from the get-go, there was not simply a conflict between common
law countries and civil countries. It was not simply a pitting against the ideologies;
there were many states from within civil systems that held widely divergent views
as to how to best unify the system. Most countries focused on the practical
problems that came along with instituting such an ambitious international agree-
ment. The issues and concerns raised by the countries ran the gamut from those
States that considered the lack of uniformity to be such a miniscule problem that it
was not worth addressing to other nations seeing it as potentially such a divisive
issue that to try to resolve it would be futile. What is clear however is that it was
seen as an important enough problem in which to invest significant resources and
time, but to date, there has been no final solution. This paper will discuss many of
these issues in further detail in the analysis that follows.
44. The Working Group on International Contract Practices was composed of the
States' members of the Commission: Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana,
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Japan, Kenya, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and
Tobago, USSR, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America. See Report of the Working Group on International Con-
tract Practices on the work of its second session, [1981 12 Y.B. Int'l Trade Comm'n
25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/197.
45. Working Paper submitted to the Working Group on International Contract Practices
at its second session, [1981] 12 Y.B. Int'l Trade Comm'n 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
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They further determined that the scope of the model should not cover
all types of prearranged sums-but it should only cover agreed sums that
were categorized as liquidated damages or penalty clauses. The commis-
sion noted that there are instances where pre-arranged sums are used
upon a certain triggering event, but these would not fall under the ambit
of the model draft because the payment of the agreed sum was not sub-
ject to non-performance or delay. Though these terms are similar to liq-
uidated damages and penalties, they do not quite fit under the same
rubric as the two clauses that were the focus of UNCITRAL's attention.
Such clauses were, for example, a termination fee or the acceleration of
payments upon nonperformance. The commission viewed these not to be
an agreement for a sum upon breach, but rather the price payable for the
exercise of an option-for instance the right to walk away from the con-
tract. They lacked the same requirement that the obligor be tied to com-
mit a primary obligation before the sum is to be paid.46
The working group was also in full agreement that the stipulated sum
would only be enforceable if the obligor was actually liable for his failure
to perform. This essentially meant that the obligee could not demand
payment if the breach was due to force majeur, or other instances that
typically exculpate nonperforming parties from their obligations under
contract law. The working group believed the scope of liability should
not extend to "circumstances constituting casus fortuitus, and acts imput-
able to the promisee leading to the promisor's inability to perform the
main obligation. ' '47 The working group also had little conflict over the
notion that if the obligee seeks to enforce the agreed sum, he was no
longer entitled to enforce the original obligation. In later drafts the
working group clarified this principle so that if a penalty or liquidated
damages clause was included for a delay in performance, the obligor
could enforce both the sum and the performance. They reasoned that the
purpose of the fee for delay was to strongly encourage timely perform-
ance, but even in the event of delay, the obligee still desired delivery of
the object of the original contract.
WG.2/WP.33. [hereinafter "Working Paper"] Sometimes parties purposefully
leave their intentions ambiguous because they would like the agreed sum to play
both roles depending on the circumstances of the breach. The working group gave
the example of a contract for sale of pneumatic plant by a Western European en-
terprise to an Asian Enterprise where the agreement for delay read "[w]ith the
exception of force majeure causes involving extension of period as set forth ... if
there should be any delay in FOB delivery . . . a compensation of delay will be
withheld from the supplier's ten percent balance." At times parties seek compen-
sation for breach, but it may be feared that the pre-estimate will be deemed ex post
to exceed actual damages. In those instances the obligee may want it to be a pen-
alty. The working group also gave an example of such a situation in a contract for
sale of equipment between a North American enterprise to a foreign enterprise:
"In the event the said liquidated damages are held by a Court of competent juris-
diction to be unenforceable for any reason whatsoever, it is hereby agreed and
expressly declared that the aforesaid amounts shall be penalties." Id.
46. "Such a clause deviates from the traditional conception of a liquidated damages
clause as constituting an accessory obligation." Id. at 33 n.22.
47. Id. at 34.
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The working group also tentatively concluded that it needed to agree to
the definition of the type of contract to be enforced. Some characteriza-
tion on its international nature needed to be established. They discussed,
and the finished product actually reflected, a borrowing of the language
from the CISG. 48 They thought the way that the CISG determined
whether a contract was international was simple and could be applied to a
variety of contracts that the proposed rules would govern. 49 It was also
believed that it would expand the scope of CISG coverage if the same
terms were used. UNCITRAL believed this would help integrate a more
robust coverage of international uniformity on the important issue of
cross border contracting generally.50
2. Points of Disagreement of the Working Party
One of the major points of disagreement between the members of the
working group was the ability to adjust the sum either up or down, de-
pending on the circumstances. Of great concern was whether the agreed
sum was the absolute ceiling to be imposed for damages. Some members
felt that it should be since the entire purpose of the clause is to provide
some certainty to the obligor so he knows what the extent of his liability
may be. They thought it would be unfair for the parties to freely enter
into a liquidated damages sum only to later have the obligee claim his
actual damages exceeded this amount. Other members believed that the
presumption should be that if breach has occurred, the obligee is only
entitled to the agreed sum, unless he then satisfies the burden to prove his
damages actually exceeded the agreed sum. The proponents of this view
believed that the obligee was entitled to full recovery and if actual dam-
ages were unanticipated, he should not bear this burden if he is capable
of proving the actual amount in court.51
Also, of great disagreement was the downward adjustment of penalty
clauses. It has been the standard in systems based upon the Napoleonic
Code, such as the French Code that judges have the discretion to adjust a
penalty clause downward if it is excessive to the amount of harm actually
48. See CISG, supra note 40, art. 1 (for a description of the international character of
a contract-the UNCITRAL final draft copied this nearly verbatim).
49. See Working Paper, supra note 45, at 39.
50. This specific point was later raised by the Austrian delegate in a subsequent report.
51. Not all civil law countries' domestic law is in harmony in this respect. For instance
some nations do not require a judicial modification of the clause upward in order
to recompense an aggrieved party who has agreed to too low a sum-the obligee
need only prove his excess damages and he will get them. See, e.g., OR art. 161
(Switz.) ("If the damages suffered exceeds the amount of the penalty, the obligee
may recover the excess only in so far as he proves fault"). Compare this approach
with that of the French: Under the French Civil Code Article 1152 (prior to 1975),
even if obligee could prove excess damages, he was barred from recovery of this
proven amount. CiV. CODE art. 1152 (Fr.). Following the 1975 amendment, the
court is authorized to increase the amount of the agreed amount if it is "ridicu-
lously small." Theoretically this still may not amount to the actual damages suf-
fered or even proved, but one may conclude that the French court will bring the
amount closely in line with the actual damages suffered by the obligee.
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suffered. 52 The problem is that, though adjustment was almost univer-
sally acknowledged as a necessity to protect against oppressive bargain-
ing, allowing judges to make this type of modification re-injects
uncertainty into the process. Parties are then unable to truly anticipate
their potential liabilities or potential recompense if a judge can substan-
tially adjust the sum.
The members of the working group had very divergent views on down-
ward adjustment; at least four alternatives of the wording of the judicial
modification clause were formulated which reflected the varying levels of
mistrust of judges, or at least a strong reluctance to not have absolute
certainty. 53 It was, however, concluded that despite Variation C, which
called for no judicial adjustment whatsoever, the other three formulations
all essentially agreed that some sort of downward modification would be
desirable. This would "make the sum mainly compensatory, although the
reduced sum may to a minor extent exceed the compensatory damages
which a national system might award. '54
B. MARCH 1981 WORKING GROUP FINDINGS
Before the working group took up the adjustability issue again, the
Secretary General issued a report that gave a synopsis of the responses it
received from the national committees of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC). The ICC had circulated to member states a question-
naire to obtain their feedback on various issues relating to these clauses.
It is not clear which countries were solicited, but the only countries to
respond to the draft at the time were Belgium, France, Finland, Germany,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Korea, Sweden, and Turkey. It was
52. See Civ. CODE art. 1152 (Fr.) (note that this downward adjustment has only been
in effect since the 1975 amendment). See also GEROLD HERRMANN, THE TRANS-
NATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CONTRI-
BUTION OF UNCITRAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
43 (Norbert Horn Ed., 1982) (stating that the reduction of an agreed sum was a
"controversial question").
53. See Working Paper, supra note 45, at 38 (The four variants were:
Variant A: "An agreement stipulating a sum payable on breach of the
contract shall be void if it is grossly excessive in relationship to both (a)
the harm that could reasonably have been anticipated from the breach,
and (b) the actual harm caused thereby. The foregoing relationships are
not excessive to the extent that such harm cannot be precisely predicted
or established."
Variant B: "The sum stipulated may be reduced by the court when it is
manifestly excessive, but only where such sum did not constitute a genu-
ine pre-estimate by the parties of the damages likely to be suffered by
the promisee."
Variant C: This was a provision to the effect that a court should not have
the power AT ALL to modify the sum stipulated.
Variant D: "Any penalty clause the amount of which, at the time when it
was stipulated, was manifestly excessive in relation to the damages which
could be foreseen as the consequence of non-fulfillment of the obliga-
tion, is deemed not to have been written.").
54. Id. at 39.
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noted that several opinions were also received from legal experts. 55
1. The States' Feedback
The questionnaire first tried to establish how frequently these types of
provisions were used, and most of the countries responded that their use
was extremely recurrent in international contracts. 56 Most countries also
agreed that the majority of contracting parties acknowledged that the use
of an agreed sum upon damages was very useful, but there were often
disagreements as to its contents. The responding States and experts went
on to say that the use of these provisions was found in all types of interna-
tional trade contracts-they were not limited to only certain genres of
contracts. 57
After establishing some more baseline questions as to the frequency
and use of these provisions, the questionnaire then proceeded to ask a
more divisive issue: "Would the drawing up of a uniform law applicable
to international contracts and reducing the difficulties which arise in the use
of such provisions be worthwhile?" The proponents of drawing up a uni-
form law cited its virtues in reducing the difficulties caused by the differ-
ences in national laws on liquidated damages and penalties. They
thought it would: reduce negotiation costs between contracting partiesl;
at a minimum, provide guidelines that could be followed by parties
should a convention not be agreed to; and provide for better remedies to
the party entitled to liquidated damages or the penalty. 58
The opponents, however, verbalized concerns which to this day may be
the types of issues that have kept unification from ever occurring. They
explained that: (a) States are hesitant to accept uniform laws in the field
of contract generally, and "in particular States which had national laws to
check abuses of liquidated damages and penalties would be reluctant to
exclude international commercial contracts from their sphere of applica-
tion;" (b) the difficulties in this area of contract law were practical in
nature and were peculiar to each transaction so they could not be re-
solved by a uniform law; and (c) a uniform law's text would necessarily be
too vague to serve much good.59 The reason provided in section (a)
seems quite telling: presumably this was referring to common law coun-
tries' reticence to have two standards of legal enforcement. The cynical
55. Unfortunately, again the official documentary record here is sparse. There is little
written beyond these limited facts.
56. Report of the Secretary-General, Analysis of Expert Opinions, and Replies to the
Secretariat Questionnaire on Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses, supra note
33, at 44. For a reproduction of the questions asked, see id.
57. The respondents said the types of contracts that they used were often contracts for
supply of goods, manufacturing and installation of plant machinery, construction
contracts, joint ventures, and long term supply of services. For loan agreements,
the penalty was often an increased rate of interest. Analysis of Expert Opinions,
and Replies to the Secretariat Questionnaire on Liquidated Damages and Penalty
Clauses, supra note 33, at 45.
58. Id. 13.
59. Id. $ 15. (emphasis added).
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member nations that responded to the questionnaire seemed to think
common law countries would be unwilling to allow their judges to enforce
clauses that would have been against public policy, but for their interna-
tional status. Something that is probably worth noting is that not one of
the member countries that responded to the questionnaire was from the
common law tradition.
Lastly, the questionnaire asked if the parties could offer any alterna-
tives, other than a uniform law, that might reduce the difficulties of using
these provisions in international transactions. The respondents came up
with two possible alternatives: (a) to draw up standard contracts or gen-
eral conditions which would aid parties in developing their contracts
based on a model; or (b) to create guidelines with an analysis and solu-
tion to the problems encountered. Those who were in favor of a model
law or a convention saw these two alternatives as a waste of time-no
certainty would be achieved which was the whole purpose of this interna-
tional effort.
C. NOVEMBER 1981 WORKING GROUP FINDINGS
1. Discussion of the Prior Regional Attempts
In the commission's fifteenth session, the Secretary General's report
began by detailing the two previous efforts at unification, which were
both only regional. It discussed how the Council of Europe formulated a
set of principles in Resolution (78) 3 "on penal clauses in civil law." This
resolution "recommend[ed] to member Governments that they take the
principles into consideration when preparing new legislation on the sub-
ject, and consider the extent to which the principles can be applied, sub-
ject to any necessary modifications, to any other clauses which have the
same aim or effect as penal clauses."'60 The commission also described
briefly the Benelux Convention that was entered into between Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1973, which compelled member
states to adopt into their national legislation, common treatment of cer-
tain provisions set forth in the convention.61
It is important to bear in mind that these two prior attempts were both
limited to regional trade agreements and were limited to countries within
the same legal tradition-the civil law. It is no surprise then that the UN
Commission's world-wide goal would be a much more difficult task to
achieve than the mere regional integration of countries with very similar
legal traditions. It does not seem that the differences between Belgium,
Holland, and Luxembourg would be substantial enough to freeze an in-
60. Report of the Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: text of draft uni-
form rules on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, together with commentary
thereon, [1982] 13 Y.B. Int'l Trade Comm'n 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/218 [hereinafter
The Rule]. The entire text of Resolution (78)3 is reprinted at the end of this paper
in Annex 1.
61. At the time of this Secretary General report, the Benelux Convention had not
entered into force. The text of the Benelux Convention is reprinted at the end of
this paper in Annex 2.
2009]
798 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
ternational agreement. Presumably, since their domestic treatment on
this subject was already in fairly close conformity, this convention-which
at the time of the UN draft had not come into effect-did little but codify
what essentially already existed, with minor adjustments. 62
A much more arduous task would be to get Britain's and the United
States' legal systems in line with the rest of the world on this subject.
Without these two countries-and to a lesser extent Canada, South Af-
rica, and Australia-in the fold, major economic players would be ex-
cluded from this important work. The desire to have transactions
between civil law economic actors and U.S./U.K. parties would have been
a very strong motivation to get this convention accepted by the common
law countries.63 The problem, though, was that these countries held very
dearly to the public policy and efficient breach reasons for not upholding
these clauses. 64 Integrating these states into a uniform framework would
prove to be an uphill battle.
2. Drafting of the Unified Rules
During this fifteenth session, UNCITRAL decided that until the form
of the finished product was finalized, the working group would continue
to work on a draft and call it the "Rules." Until it was determined that
the ultimate document would be a binding convention, a model law or
merely general conditions, they proceeded by developing these Rules.
The working group wanted to give as much effect as possible to interna-
tional trade practice as it currently existed. As such, it was cognizant that
the contracting parties shouldn't be tied into the default Rules. It was
agreed that parties should have the ability to deviate from the provisions
should they so choose. The only thing that the parties could not derogate
from was the defining scope of the Rules and most importantly, the abil-
ity of a court or arbitral tribunal to adjust an oppressive agreement. 65
UNCITRAL then set forth a complete draft of the Rules in both a
version that could be adopted as a model law or a convention. They
noted that if a convention was the route to be taken, additional standard-
ized language would need to be included that would allow it to be entered
into force. And if a model law was the end result, different language
62. Furthermore, the content of the Benelux Convention seems far more administra-
tive than substantive. It doesn't discuss issues like the actual enforceability of the
clauses. The convention concerns itself mostly with minor details like harmonizing
a statute of limitations for recovery of a penal sum.
63. Also, the fact that many parties select U.S. or U.K. law as the governing law in
their contracts-even if neither party is from those states-makes harmonization
by these major legal systems very important.
64. Though both of these rationales might have been standing in the way, from the
circumstantial evidence, it appears that the public policy reasons were the more
offensive to common law countries. In no recorded discussions was efficient
breach really brought forth as a reason that adoption would be difficult.
65. It was rightfully surmised that the sole purpose of a court adjusting a penalty
clause would be to protect against an unfair bargain. If the stronger party could
simply put in an oppressive penalty and then state that the sum is not adjustable by
a tribunal, then a patently unfair result would occur.
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needed to be included to enable the adopting states to integrate it into
their own national legislation. This language needed to provide for flexi-
bility so that it could be "workable within the legal system of that state.
The legislature of the State adopting the law would be the appropriate
body to decide on what provisions are necessary. '66
3. The Draft Articles of the Rules
The commission decided at this time to put forth a draft of the Rules
that would later be commented upon in future sessions. At its outset, this
draft established what types of parties would be covered. Draft Article A
concluded that, for the purposes of the Rules, neither the nationality nor
the commercial character of the parties should be considered in deter-
mining the applicability of the Rules. 67 The commentary noted that some
legal systems treat the classification of the parties as relevant to the type
of law to be applied. For instance some countries will apply different laws
to civil versus commercial actors, whereas other states do not make this
classification. 68 The commission wanted the Rules to be applied uni-
formly so they determined this distinction should be irrelevant. 69
Draft Article B resolved that if a party has more than one place of
business, then the place of business that is most closely related to the
66. The Rule, supra note 60, at 28.
67. Draft Article A gives slightly different proposed language for a Convention or a
Model Law, whichever is to be adopted.
" The language for paragraph 1 of a Convention reads: "This convention applies
to contracts in which the parties have agreed [in writing] that, upon a total or
partial failure of performance by a party (the obligor), another party (the obli-
gee) is entitled to recover, or to forfeit an agreed sum of money when, at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, the parties have their places of business
in different Contracting States."
" The language for paragraph 1 of a Model Law reads: "This law applies to con-
tract in which the parties have agreed [in writing] that, upon a total or partial
failure of performance by a party (the obligor), another party (the obligee) is
entitled to recover, or to forfeit an agreed sum of money: (a) When at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, the parties have their places of business in
different States, and (b) When the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of (the State adopting the Model Law)."
" The language in paragraphs 2 and 3 applies to either a Convention or a Model
Law. It reads: (2) "The fact that the parties have their place of business in
different states is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either
from the contract or from any dealings between, or from information disclosed
by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract." (3)
"Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of
the parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining
the application of this (Convention) (law)."
The Rule, supra note 60, at 28-29.
68. The Rule, supra note 60, at 31. An example of a country which supplies different
levels of legal protections depending on the commercial nature of the actors is
Germany. German Commercial Code § 348 says "A contractual penalty, which a
merchant promised in the course of carrying on his trade, may not be reduced by
reason of the provisions of §343 of the Civil Code." Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB]
[Commercial Code], § 348 (translation from THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE
752 (Simon L. Goren trans., 2d ed. Oct. 28, 1994)).
69. The Rule, supra note 60, at 31. This closely mirrors the language in CISG art. 1(3).
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contract and its performance is the relevant location. 70 The commission
further stipulated that if the party has no place of business, then reference
is to be made to his "habitual residence." The commentary noted that
the place of incorporation or its main place of business is not the relevant
inquiry, but rather where the place is that "has the closest relationship to
the contract and its performance. ' 71 The commission was aware that the
parties contemplated for this program would generally be sophisticated
"businessmen who have recognized places of business," but it still felt
nonetheless that consideration should be given to the occasional actor
who does not have an established place of business but would otherwise
fall under the ambit of these Rules. They determined that such actors'
habitual residence should thus be considered. 72
Draft Article C is very important to analyze. 73 The commission
surmised that one of the major roadblocks in obtaining broad acceptance
and ratification would be the domestic reluctance of countries who
thought penalty clauses violated public policy because, through inequita-
ble bargains, oppressive clauses were formed. The Commission therefore
determined that the Rules should only apply to sophisticated actors so as
to prevent this perceived oppression. Presumably, if the only parties who
qualified under this convention or model law were knowledgeable com-
mercial players, then the courts wouldn't as frequently need to analyze
issues of unconscionability ex post.7 4 Article C stipulated that this con-
vention or law would not apply to contracts concerning consumer or per-
sonal goods, or anything to be used for the household purposes of a party.
This carve-out was made so that each country would be free to uses its
domestic laws to protect weaker parties-it was a conscious effort made
to ensure that "no conflict would arise with the Rules."'75 This consumer
goods carve-out was, however, qualified with the provision that if the
other party, at the conclusion of the contract, did not know, and had no
reason to know that the wares were to be used for household purposes,
70. Draft Article B reads: "For the purposes of this (Convention) (law): (1) If a party
has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which has the
closest relationship to the contract and its performance, having regard to the cir-
cumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the
conclusion of the contract. (2) If a party does not have a place of business, refer-
ence is to be made to his habitual residence." The Rule, supra note 60, at 29.
71. The Rule, supra note 60, at 32. This language was copied verbatim from CISG
article 10(a).
72. The Rule, supra note 60, at 32. This appears to also have been copied from CISG
art. 10(b).
73. Draft Article C reads: "This (convention) (law) does not apply to contracts con-
cerning goods, other property or services which are to be supplied for the personal,
family or household purposes of a party, unless the other party, at any time before
or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known the
contract was concluded for such a purpose." The Rule, supra note 60, at 29.
74. The Rule, supra note 60, at 32.
75. Id.
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then the Rules would still be applicable.7 6 This caveat was meant to en-
sure that a promisee, who could not have known the use of the contracted
for supplies was to be for personal purposes, could rely on the provisions
of the Rules to ensure the liquidated damage and penalty clauses would
be enforced.
Draft Article D was simply a reiteration of the earlier provision that
passed without much debate that the obligor had to pay the agreed sum
only if he was actually liable for non-performance.77 This prevented pay-
ment in instances of the usual exculpatory situations-force majeur, ab-
sence of fault, etc. These determinations were to be made in accordance
with the applicable domestic law. 78 One unfortunate consequence of the
drafting of Article D is that it seems to open up the issue of proof of fault,
which the obligee probably sought to avoid by demanding a prearranged
sum to begin with.7 9
Draft Article E allowed for recovery of the sum and compulsion of per-
formance only in instances where the sum was stipulated for delay in per-
formance. 80 In all other instances of breach, the obligee could only
choose performance or payment of the sum. This article however did
allow for the parties to derogate from this should they choose to by indi-
cating that "[t]he rules set forth above shall not prejudice any contrary
agreement made by the parties." 81 Article E essentially concerned itself
with the problem of overcompensating the obligee. It was determined
that to enforce both the obligation and the payment would in many in-
stances lead to unjust enrichment for the obligee. However, as described
earlier, the commission felt that if the sum was stipulated to for the pur-
pose of delay, then it would make sense to have both performance and
76. Note this language deviates from CISG art. 2 which does not apply to household
goods unless the "seller" didn't know nor had reason to know it was for that pur-
pose. Draft Article C applies to either party.
77. Draft Article D reads: "Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the obligee is
not entitled to recover or to forfeit the agreed sum if the obligor is not liable for
the failure of performance." The Rule, supra note 60, at 29.
78. Which in some instances may be the CISG since it is a binding treaty that becomes
part of the signatory's domestic law.
79. This once again raises the issue of the balance between fairness and certainty. If
the obligor is not at fault, it seems unfair to place liability on him to pay the sum,
but the clear result of the draft language is that the obligee, which has relied on the
prearranged sum to protect him if there is nonperformance, now must bear the loss
himself.
80. Draft Article E reads:
(1) Where the agreed sum is to be recoverable or forfeited on delay in
performance of the obligation, the obligee is entitled to both perform-
ance of the obligation and the agreed sum. (2) Where the agreed sum is
to be recoverable or forfeited on non-performance or defective perform-
ance other than delay, the obligee is entitled either to performance, or to
recover or forfeit the agreed sum, unless the agreed sum cannot reasona-
bly be regarded as a substitute for performance. (3) The rules set forth
above shall not prejudice any contrary agreement made by the parties.
The Rule, supra note 60, at 29.
81. Id.
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compensation of the sum. 82
Draft Article F speaks to the ability of an obligee to obtain damages in
excess of the stipulated amount. 83 As described in the earlier Working
Group documents discussed above, this was an issue that concerned some
commentators because it allowed for fairness at the expense of certainty.
Article F entitles the obligee to recover the sum and states that he "is
entitled to damages to the extent of the loss not covered by the agreed
sum, but only if he can prove that his loss grossly exceeds the agreed
sum."84 The commentary spoke of the tension between sureness and eq-
uity-that it is useful for the obligee to know his potential liabilities, but a
"restriction would cause hardship to the obligee if his actual loss exceeds
the agreed sum."'85 The provision was deemed to be a compromise be-
tween these two poles-it allowed recovery after the obligee meets his
burden of proof AND such loss is grossly in excess of damage. It appears
then that there is a de minimis threshold that the drafters wanted so that
courts would not be bogged down with the same sort of squabbles the
model Rules aimed to avoid in the first place.86 It is also important to
note that the parties may expressly provide that the agreed sum is an
absolute cap-in these instances the obligor could know for certain his
potential liabilities, but the default provision will not guarantee this cer-
tainty unless the parties make it explicit. 87
Draft Article G is also concerned with the tension between justice and
certainty.88 This provision, however, does not speak to whether a party
can obtain sums in excess of the agreed amount, but whether courts or
tribunals can reduce an agreed amount. It is fairly well established in
many civilian systems, and even in the UNIDROIT principles, that in the
event that an agreed sum significantly penalizes the breaching party, the
82. Id. at 33. For an earlier discussion the issue of delay, see supra page 21 of this
paper.
83. Draft Article F reads:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, if a failure of performance in
respect of which the parties have agreed that a sum of money is to be
recoverable or forfeited occurs, the obligee is entitled, in respect of the
failure, to recover or forfeit the sum, and is entitled to damages to the
extent of the loss not covered by the agreed sum, but only if he can prove
that his loss grossly exceeds the agreed sum.
The Rule, supra note 60, at 29.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 34. Note the commentary in the quoted passage did not reference "grossly
exceeds", but just "exceeds." It seems that the commentator was concerned that
any excess damage would be unfair, but it would be administratively impossible to
determine exact harm, so the language of gross excess was ultimately employed.
86. Such squabbles would be, for instance, determining the minute details of damages.
Unless the obligee clearly was undercompensated, then a court would not involve
itself in the matter.
87. The Rule, supra note 60, at 34 n.39.
88. Draft Article G reads:
(1) The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal.
(2) However, the agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to be grossly
disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been suffered by the obli-
gee, and if the agreed sum cannot reasonably be regarded as a genuine
pre-estimate by the parties of the loss likely to be suffered by the obligee.
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court has some discretion to modify the award downward. 89 Article G of
the Rules boldly starts by stating in subsection (1): "[t]he agreed sum
shall not be reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal." It then immediately
qualifies this in subsection (2) by saying:
[h]owever, the agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to be
grossly disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been suffered
by the obligee, and if the agreed sum cannot be reasonably regarded
as a genuine pre-estimate by the parties of the loss likely to be suf-
fered by the obligee. 90
4. Editorial Comment on Draft Article G
The interesting thing to note about Draft Article G quoted above is that
it seems like the commission is making the court analyze the damages
looking both backward and forward. Essentially, this means that the pre-
estimate will be evaluated after the fact by the court with attention as to
what the actual damage was. Additionally, in a somewhat strange way,
the commission is requiring that the obligee must have actually made a
bona fide or "genuine pre-estimate" of loss that might be suffered. This
judicial analysis of the parties' subjective intent seems to contravene the
whole premise of the proposed convention-to give legal effect to the
will of the parties as evidenced in their writing. It should be irrelevant
whether the parties intended the clause to be coercive, what should only
matter, as far as the court is concerned, is whether enforcing the penalty
would result in an outcome that contravenes public policy. Only then
should the award be modified. It is the opinion of this author that the ex
post analysis of the parties' subjective intent ex ante does little to serve
the interest of equity. The commentary to Article G of the rules says this
second limitation-that it must be a "genuine pre-estimate" of the poten-
tial loss of the obligee-is "justified by the view that agreements aiming
solely at the compensation for loss caused by failure to perform deserve
to be encouraged." 91
This author recognizes the philosophical and practical reasons the
drafters wanted to encourage good faith pre-estimates of damage, and
discourage provisions that were known to be in excess of possible dam-
ages, but it does not seem that this second prong does anything to pro-
mote equity-it only prevents obligees who place high subjective value
on performance or who wish to insure themselves against breach through
paying a premium from actually inserting these clauses. 92 It seems that if
an obligee puts in a clause that he knows to exceed potential damage by,
89. See, e.g., Civ. CODE art. 1152 (Fr.); BGB §343 (F.R.G.); OR art. 163 (Switz.); and
UNIDROIT principles §7.4.13(2).
90. The Rule, supra note 60, at 29 (emphasis added).
91. The Rule, supra note 60.
92. This may, however, have been an attempt to pacify common law judges by making
the clauses appear to be more of a good faith pre-estimate of damages, and thus
not void under public policy considerations. The final iteration of the Rules does
not contain this language-this absence is later discussed in further detail.
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say ten percent, and then the obligor does breach, the court should en-
force this because ten percent is not so excessive as to contravene good
morals. Under the Draft Article G, this would be unenforceable because
the obligee knew it would be in excess of the potential harm he might
suffer. Perversely, however, if this same liquidated damages clause was
inserted by the same obligee, but in this instance he actually thought the
sum roughly mirrored his potential losses, but in actuality the sum ended
up being too high by ten percent, the court would enforce it. The obligor
would not be harmed anymore and the obligee would no longer be en-
riched, but strangely the drafters seem to demand a good faith require-
ment of sorts.93 This author believes this second requirement adds little
to the protection of weak parties. A modification based solely on a back-
wards analysis of harm actually suffered satisfactorily protects weaker
parties. 94
D. MAY AND JUNE 1982 GOVERNMENT COMMENTARY
Following the creation of the 1981 Draft Rules previously discussed,
these Rules were then circulated to "interested international organiza-
tions and all Governments for their comments. ' 95 In May 1982, re-
sponses were received from Austria, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Cyprus,
Japan, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
Venezuela, and the Soviet Union. By June of 1982, an additional four
countries had responded: the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary,
the Netherlands, and Norway. 96 It appears that the information was cir-
culated to all UN Member States, but the response was rather lackluster.
Only eighteen countries ever responded, and of the countries that did, the
only true common law country was Canada.97 The commentary of the
93. It may be that the good faith requirement is more of a symbolic safeguard than a
practical one as it is difficult to prove a lack of good faith. The drafters may have
simply wished to encourage good faith despite their understanding that its absence
could rarely be proved. The requirement of good faith dealing is an important
obligation in civil law countries-most, if not all have a good faith requirement
codified into law, which must be applied in all contractual dealings. See, generally,
CIv. CODE art. 1134 (Fr.); BGB § 242 (F.R.G.); a good faith requirement is even
found in U.C.C § 1-304.
94. It should be noted that in the final draft of the Rules, the language requiring the
parties to make making a genuine pre-estimate of the damages suffered was con-
spicuously missing. A more thorough discussion of this important absence is de-
scribed at length below.
95. Draft uniform rules on liquidated damages and penalty clauses: analysis of the re-
sponses of Governments and international organizations, [1982] 13 Y.B. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/219 (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Draft Expert
Analysis"].
96. Responses were also received from the following international organizations:
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
97. The Philippines might also be considered a common law country. See In Re
Shoop, 41 Phil. 213 (1920). Noteworthy is that there were numerous common law
nations in the working group, including Great Britain and the United States; it
seems surprising that these common law juggernauts would not make any com-
ment or bother to respond to the questionnaire, when presumably, they had the
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countries did however shed some important light on what kinds of issues
were foreseen to be potential obstructions to widespread acceptance.
The responding states had differing views as to what the most appropriate
form the uniform Rules should take.98
1. Those in Favor of a Convention
Austria, Argentina, Chile, Cyprus, the Netherlands, the Philippines,
and the Soviet Union believed the appropriate form should be a binding
convention. They proposed that a convention would be the best embodi-
ment of the rules because it would: (1) gain wide acceptance as it was
negotiated by a large group of states; (2) provide the greatest certainty of
unifying the common and civil law systems; (3) take precedence over na-
tional law-giving certainty to it-and if domestic law changes, the con-
vention would not be affected. These countries saw a convention as the
most desirable method despite its high cost of negotiation.
Some of the responding states who believed a convention was a bad
idea set forth the following reasons: ( 1) that it would hardly be adhered
to by many countries; (2) that the need for unification on this subject is
not that great; (3) that developing nations do not see this as a priority for
devoting their resources; and (4) the small number of articles in the draft
is not appropriate for a worldwide convention. One country-Canada-
believed that the convention should only apply to the transaction if both
the contracting parties agreed to it in writing.
2. Those in Favor of a Model Law
A number of states felt that the best form of unification would be a
model law. A model law is a suggested pattern for legislators in individ-
ual governments to consider adopting as part of their domestic legisla-
tion. The states in favor of this form were: Hungary, Japan, Poland,
Republic of Korea, and Spain. These states believed this would be the
best way to actually get the changes made in domestic legislation because
it would allow individual governments to look to the model and make any
necessary changes needed to conform to their own domestic policies. The
critics of this view pounced on its flexibility as its most undesirable trait:
Germany, Austria, and the Philippines believed that national govern-
ments would only adopt the rules sparingly and with significant altera-
tions. 99 Different states would make different modifications and the
whole premise-to create unification and certainty-would be rendered a
pointless exercise.
most to say about the model rules, and it was their legal systems that would lead to
the most difficulties in adoption.
98. Unfortunately, the lack of documentary evidence is frustrating. It is not clear what
some of the major players' views on this matter were. For instance, it is not clear
what stance the United States or even France took.
99. Draft Expert Analysis, supra note 95, at 36; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/219/Add.1 at 39.
2009]
806 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
3. Those in Favor of UNCITRAL Rules (General Conditions)
Some countries felt that the best alternative was to make the uniform
rules in the form of General Conditions. General Conditions give parties
guidance in drafting their contracts by giving illustrative examples of pro-
visions to be used. The main upshot of this format is that the Rules
would not apply unless the parties expressly agree to opt into them. The
countries in favor for this method were Canada, The Federal Republic of
Germany, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and Venezuela. These nations con-
tended that this form: (1) would give the parties great freedom in the
way they form their contracts; (2) would offer uniform criteria that the
parties would be able to adopt; and (3) could be used by parties immedi-
ately after the Commission finalizes them-rather than the lengthy treaty
ratification process or the slow adoption of model laws by national legis-
latures. . Norway noted that the problems relating to modification (Arti-
cles F and G), which have been the most contentious provisions, could be
left to each state's applicable law. Venezuela took a realistic-if not cyni-
cal-approach to the matter and stated "unification in this field is not a
matter of priority, the formulation of general conditions is the most prac-
tical and realistic approach, despite limited unification achieved
thereby." 100
The criticism of adopting this structure was that general conditions are
invalid if they conflict with mandatory provisions of the applicable law
regulating liquidated damages or penalty clauses. 10 1 Essentially, even if
parties agree to insert a penalty clause, there is no guarantee a court or
tribunal will enforce it if it contravenes the domestic law. Having such a
provision would thus be wasteful-and using the international commu-
nity's resources to establish these conditions would be doubly so. Addi-
tionally, Argentina argued that there was no guarantee that parties would
ever actually incorporate these terms into their contracts. 10 2 The lack of
widespread usage would largely defeat the purpose of worldwide
harmonization.
4. Substantive Provisions: Concerns and Comments
After the responding parties set forth their preferences for the final
embodiment of the Rules, and gave their analysis of why or why not the
alternatives were viable, the responding states proceeded to discuss the
substantive provisions in more detail. Sweden took issue with the draft-
ing of Article E, because it noted that in some instances, if enforcing the
sum and performance in the event of delay, it is not clear when extreme
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id.
102. Though there is no empirical data that this author could find on whether parties
actually incorporated model terms into their agreements, this might be an interest-
ing point for further analysis. A good place to start would be to evaluate the fre-
quency with which parties willingly adopt UNIDROIT principles into their
contracts-this might give some indication as to the utility or futility of such a
form.
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delay has ripened into non-performance. Sweden suggested "it may be
impossible to determine whether the breach is delay or non-performance
until the delay has lasted so long that it is evident performance will never
take place. ' 10 3 Though it didn't propose an alternative to the language,
Sweden did highlight this as an issue that could be problematic.1 0 4 The
unavoidable end result of this problem then, is that the determination of
whether delay has risen to the level of nonperformance would be left to
the applicable domestic law.
One provision that caused a good deal of debate was once again Draft
Article G. 10 5 Sweden was of the opinion that all factors should be consid-
ered by a court, both before the contract and after its conclusion in deter-
mining whether to adjust it downward. In essence, they propounded a
holistic approach. Argentina countered however, that limiting judicial in-
tervention preserves certainty and therefore Article G (2), which allows
for judicial modification, should be construed restrictively. Argentina
proposed that there should be a reduction only when "the disproportion
between the loss suffered by the obligee and the agreed sum is such that
by recovering the agreed sum the obligee will obtain an obvious, unequiv-
ocal and clearly disproportionate advantage without any justifying
cause. °10 6 Clearly, Argentina was of the opinion that certainty should
win out over equity. It appears the country wanted to exercise as much
judicial restraint as possible and give legal effect to these clauses unless
they were outrageous. The ultimate language, despite Argentina's sug-
gestions, did not include this limiting language-it only required that "the
agreed sum is substantially disproportionate in relation to the loss that
has been suffered by the obligee. 1 07
The Federal Republic of Germany also noted that if the Rules take the
form of General Conditions, then Article G will be moot because many
countries already have built in protections for weaker parties such as un-
103. Report of the Secretary-General: Analysis of expert opinions and of replies to the
Secretariat questionnaire on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
33, at 38.
104. Sweden also was concerned with the language in Draft Article F, which allowed an
upward adjustment if the obligee's damages exceeded the agreed sum. They
noted, as others had, that this removes certainty for the parties. They did acknowl-
edge the provision's utility, but requested a broadening of the things to be consid-
ered for the upward adjustment by a court, such as gross negligence of the obligor.
The final draft didn't contain this language despite Sweden's request.
105. Draft Article G reads: "(1) The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or
arbitral tribunal. (2) However, the agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to be
grossly disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been suffered by the obli-
gee, and if the agreed sum cannot reasonably be regarded as a genuine pre-esti-
mate by the parties of the loss likely to be suffered by the obligee." The Rule,
supra note 60, at 29.
106. Report of the Secretary-General: Analysis of expert opinions and of replies to the
Secretariat questionnaire on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
33, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
107. Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of Per-
formance, [1983] 14 Y.B. Int'l Trade Comm'n 272, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/243 [herein-
after "Uniform Rules"].
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conscionability, lesi6n etc.108 Germany believed that, in such cases, there
should be some language stating that when the Rules conflict with
mandatory provisions of domestic law, the latter shall prevail. 109 Lastly,
the Netherlands made a comment here that appears to have gained wide
support. They advocated that the adjustability of a court or tribunal is
not a provision that should be waivable by the parties and that this rule
should be explicitly stated. As discussed before, it would be patently un-
fair to allow an oppressive sum to be included, because of uneven bar-
gaining power, only to have it then be uncontestable by the oppressed
party because the stronger party was able to include another clause stat-
ing that the sum was not subject to modification. 110
V. THE FINAL DRAFT
After nearly four years of formulation, UNCITRAL finally created a
document that was to be submitted to the Member Nations for them to
determine whether to enact it as a model law or to ratify it as a conven-
tion. This final draft contained language to make it adaptable as either a
convention or alternatively a model law. The uniform rules that the doc-
ument contained reflected much of the language and commentary that
the parties discussed in the various sessions, and which this paper has
spoken of at length. Some suggestions seem to have been dismissed off-
hand and others apparently received wide support as they were embodied
in the final draft.
A. TEXT OF THE UNIFORM RULES
The final draft of the uniform Rules is as follows:"'
108. See, e.g,. U.C.C. § 2-302; BGB §138(2) (F.R.G.) ("A legal transaction by which a
person exploiting the need, inexperience, lack of sound judgment or substantial
lack of will power of another, causes to be promised or granted to himself or to a
third party in exchange for a performance, pecuniary advantages which are in ob-
vious disproportion o the performance is also void."); Mexican Civil Code art. 17
("If by reason of extreme ignorance, inexperience or hardship of one party, an-
other person obtains an excessive enrichment which is evidently disproportionate
to the consideration given in return, the injured party shall have the right to elect a
rescission of the contract or an adjustment in the consideration due from him, in
addition to the damages suffered thereby."); Civil Code, Book Four §13(Chili);
Civil Code art. 157(Braz.) ("An injury shall be held to occur whenever a person,
under urgent need, or for inexperience, undertakes to a payment or performance
that is manifestly disproportionate to the consideration given by the other party").
109. Report of the Secretary-General: Analysis of expert opinions and of replies to the
Secretariat questionnaire on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, supra note
33, at 40. This of course would completely eliminate the certainty the Convention
aimed to achieve. This argument did not appear to gain support as it was not in
the final draft of the Rules.
110. See supra note 64. See also Report of the Secretary General: revised text of draft
uniform rules on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, [1983] 14 Y.B. Int'l
Trade Comm'n 31 n. 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/235 (this was further codified in its
later iteration).
111. Note that the accompanying standardized language enabling it to be entered into
force as a convention has been omitted.
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UNIFORM RULES FOR CONTRACT CLAUSES FOR AN AGREED SUM DUE
UPON FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE
PART ONE: SCOPE OF APPLICATION
ARTICLE 1
These Rules apply to international contracts in which the parties have
agreed that, upon failure of performance by one party (the obligor), the
other party (the obligee) is entitled to an agreed sum from the obligor,
whether as a penalty or as compensation.
ARTICLE 2
(Formerly Draft Article A)
For the purposes of these Rules:
(a) A contract shall be considered international if, at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, the parties have their places of business in
different States;
(b) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different
States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from
the contract or from any dealings between, or from information disclosed
by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract;
(c) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial
character of the parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration
in determining the application of these rules.
ARTICLE 3
(Formerly Draft Article B)
For the purposes of these Rules:
(a) If a party has more than one place of business, his place of business
is that which has the closest relationship to the contract and its perform-
ance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by
the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract;
(b) If a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made
to his habitual residence.
ARTICLE 4
(Formerly Draft Article C)
These Rules do not apply to contracts concerning goods, other prop-
erty or services which are to be supplied for the personal, family or
household purposes of a party, unless the other party at any time before
or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have
known that the contract was concluded for such purposes.
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PART TWO: SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 5
(Formerly Draft Article D)
The obligee is not entitled to the agreed sum if the obligor is not liable
for the failure of performance.
ARTICLE 6
(Formerly Draft Article E)
(1) If the contract provides that the obligee is entitled to the agreed
sum upon delay in performance, he is entitled to both performance of the
obligation and the agreed sum.
(2) If the contract provides that the obligee is entitled to the agreed
sum upon failure of performance other than delay, he is entitled either to
performance or to the agreed sum. If, however, the agreed sum cannot
reasonably be regarded as compensation for that failure of performance,
the obligee is entitled to both performance of the obligation and the
agreed sum.
ARTICLE 7
(Formerly Draft Article F)
If the obligee is entitled to the agreed sum, he may not claim damages
to the extent of the loss covered by the agreed sum. Nevertheless, he
may claim damages to the extent of the loss not covered by the agreed
sum if the loss substantially exceeds the agreed sum.
ARTICLE 8
(Formerly Draft Article G)
The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal
unless the agreed sum is substantially disproportionate in relation to the
loss that has been suffered by the obligee.
ARTICLE 9
The parties may derogate from or vary the effect of articles 5, 6 and 7
of these Rules. 112
Rather than discuss each of these articles in turn-with the exception
of Article 8-the provisions will be allowed to speak for themselves. The
development of these provisions has been thoroughly expounded upon
through an analysis of their generation, so it seems further explication
would be redundant. There is, however, one provision that warrants fur-
112. Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of Per-
formance, supra note 107, annex 1.
AN UNCERTAIN PENALTY
ther inquiry. Article 8, which was formerly Draft Article G, should be
scrutinized further. If the two versions are compared side-by-side, the
requirement of a genuine pre-estimate of damages is conspicuously ab-
sent from the final version. The draft version did not deviate all too much
from UCC §2-718 which would make the pre-agreed sum appear to be
more of a liquidated damages clause than a penalty. The final version
though, seems to embrace the legality of a clause that serves solely as a
penalty and lacks any attempt at pre-estimating true damages. It may
help to look at the versions side by side:
DRAFT ARTICLE G
1. The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal.
2. However, the agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to be grossly
disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been suffered by the obli-
gee, and if the agreed sum cannot reasonably be regarded as a genuine
pre-estimate by the parties of the loss likely to be suffered by the obligee.
ARTICLE 8 (final version)
The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal
unless the agreed sum is substantially disproportionate in relation to the
loss that has been suffered by the obligee.
One can see that the language has changed in a slight (and probably
trivial) way: "grossly disproportionate" has become "substantially dis-
proportionate." It is not clear if there is any meaningful difference be-
tween "grossly" and "substantially," except possibly a minute difference
in outrageousness of the amount. But one non-trivial change is the axing
of the "genuine pre-estimate" by the parties portion. Now, as discussed
above in the editorial commentary on Draft Article G, it appears that the
drafters tried to move away from a version that might appeal to the com-
mon law countries and instead opted for a civil approach which would
give more legal effect to the will of the parties by enforcing a penalty that
never aimed to provide just compensation. No longer is the subjective
intent of the parties relevant; the only safeguard remaining is the judicial
ability to modify the egregiousness of an excess amount.
One can only surmise that the nixing of this key protection was a point
of contention for the common law countries and may have led to the de-
mise of UNCITRAL's harmonization attempt. Unfortunately there is no
official commentary that can be found which discusses the thought pro-
cess in dropping the genuine pre-estimate language between the creation
of Draft Article G and the final Article 8. There is also no real discussion
to be found which names the parties or countries who may have taken
objection to the draft language. One can only surmise that someone
made an objection to the inclusion of the symbolic good faith require-
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ment of a pre-estimate by highlighting its superfluity or its chilling effect
on potentially beneficial coercive clauses.
Of the sparse commentary on the matter, there is only a brief discus-
sion of the issue of the genuine pre-estimate. In June 1982, delegates
from the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway objected to the re-
quirement that both conditions be satisfied-the disproportionate sum
and the genuine pre-estimate. They argued that the provisions should be
joined by an or before the court could adjust the sum. This would effec-
tively give judges the discretion to modify an award if the sum was unrea-
sonably excessive or if the amount was meant to be a bona fide attempt at
predetermining damages. Curiously, the final draft completely deleted
any reference to a pre-estimate. It might have been the case that com-
mon law countries would have been more receptive to the draft recom-
mended by Norway and Germany, which would permit judicial discretion
if the amount was excessive or if the parties meant for it to reflect fore-
seeable damages. Without the genuine pre-estimate language, common
law countries might have felt that having judges determine when a sum is
substantially excessive as the only protection would not sufficiently pro-
tect weaker parties (or alternatively might discourage what they per-
ceived to be the desirable notion of efficient breach). 113
Other than the removal of the genuine pre-estimate language, there
seems to be little in the final draft that would be cause for much discord.
But as a point of general observation, the final draft's language does seem
to have a cleaner appearance than the earlier drafts-the finished version
lacks some of the qualifying language that the various drafters often
wanted inserted. That being said, this version seems to reflect the general
consensus that the writers and commentators came to during the many
drafts and comments over the preceding four years.
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR ADOPTION
On December 19, 1983, the General Assembly of the United Nations,
at its 101st plenary meeting, gave a brief introduction before its recom-
mendation, extolling the virtues of the Uniform Rules. The Assembly
then proceeded to "[r]ecommend[ ] that States should give consideration
to the Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for An Agreed Sum Due upon
Failure of Performance adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law and, where appropriate, implement them in the
form of either a model law or a convention."' "14
113. As discussed previously, it is not clear which justification is more important to
common law countries; public policy concerns or efficient breach. From the lim-
ited evidence, it seems the public policy concern against inequitable bargains has
been the likelier driving force.
114. G.A. Rs. 38/135, at 270 (Dec. 19, 1983). The said recommendation was qualified
by the General Assembly. It wrote:
Recognizing that a wide range of international trade contracts contain
clauses obligating a party that fails to perform an obligation under con-
tract to pay an agreed sum to the other party,
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Unfortunately, this is where the documentary record ends. Following
this General Assembly resolution, there is virtually no information as to
what the member states decided to do-or not do-with regards to the
recommendation. What is clear, however, is that somehow the proposal
died. No model law or convention was ever adopted or entered into.
UNCITRAL halted work on the matter and little has changed approxi-
mately thirty years later. UNCITRAL will only resume work on this at
Governments' requests, which for the time being do not appear to be
forthcoming.
The question we are left with is why? Why were the Uniform Rules
never adopted? Why did countless scholars and government representa-
tives toil for years on these provisions-expending countless man-hours
and unknown sums for negotiations and revisions-only to have the
Rules remain as little but a footnote in legislative history? It may never
be fully understood since the documentary record is so sparse following
the adoption by UNCITRAL of the Model Rules themselves. Unless
more first-hand documentation is obtained from the state representatives
or the drafters themselves, the only evidence we are left with is
circumstantial.
Despite the lack of a "smoking gun," it does seem that the countless
drafts do give some excellent insights as to the possible reasons this at-
tempt at uniformity never took off. It seems the philosophical hurdles
between the civil and common law systems were too significant to over-
come. It seems that the provisions might not have been an issue pressing
enough to rally enough support to effectuate anything binding for the
many countries that had other priorities for their limited legislative re-
sources. Though it was almost uniformly agreed that the disparate treat-
ment of these clauses impeded international commerce, another reason
might have been that the substance of the Uniform Rules were still too
irksome to countries that were cynical about oppressive clauses on weak
parties. Even with the allowance of judicial modification of the agreed
Noting that the effect and validity of such clauses are often uncertain
owing to disparities in the treatment of such clauses in various legal
systems,
Believing that these uncertainties constitute an obstacle to the flow of
international trade,
Being of the opinion that it would be desirable for the legal rules applica-
ble to such clauses to be harmonized so as to reduce or eliminate the
uncertainties concerning such clauses and remove these uncertainties as
a barrier to the flow of international trade,
Noting that the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
has adopted Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for An Agreed Sum
Due upon Failure of Performance,
Recognizing that there are various ways in which the Uniform Rules on
Contract Clauses for An Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of Performance
could be implemented by States, and being of the opinion that a recom-
mendation by the General Assembly to states that they should imple-
ment the Uniform Rules in an appropriate manner would not prejudice
the Assembly from making a further recommendation or taking further
action with respect to the Uniform Rules if circumstances so warrant.
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sums and the exclusion of non-sophisticated parties, the concessions
might still not have been enough to overcome the sense that injustice
would befall these weaker bargainers.
For common law countries, it might have been too uncomfortable a pill
to swallow for courts to apply two standards of justice-if the transaction
was solely domestic, then the judicial safety net could be fully applied,
but if it touched across borders, then the parties would be afforded fewer
protections. One gets the sense that a reluctance to apply these two tiers
of justice may have been what stalled the agreement. But it may have
even been the case that the effort died for lack of interest. Unless more
documentation comes to light, these questions will remain largely unan-
swered. Though, hopefully through the analysis of the generation of the
unification attempt, one can gain a better understanding of the divisive
issues, and a better appreciation of those that were readily acceded.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to elucidate some of the possible reasons the interna-
tional community has thus far failed to adopt a uniform approach to liqui-
dated damages and penalty clauses. It also attempted to give a brief
introduction into these clauses by explaining their history, their treatment
under different legal systems, and by giving a taste of the philosophical
debate that surrounds their utility. Regrettably, the objective to give con-
crete reasons for UNCITRAL's failure at unifying the international law
was not achieved due to a lack of solid evidence, but through the distilla-
tion of the many drafts and years of debate surrounding the issue, the key
ideas have been brought into focus.
It is important that this subject not fade away; these types of clauses
are still used today, and are probably more important now than they were
in 1979 as cross border trade has grown exponentially. New issues have
arisen which raise a whole slew of problems related to this matter-the
rise of new types of economic actors, the increased prevalence of out-
sourcing of services to foreign countries, the ubiquity of electronic con-
tracts with form clauses, etc. All these issues, and many others,
significantly intersect the unresolved problem of pre-arranged sums. To
this day, unless the parties provide for the applicable law-and are aware
what the corresponding conflicts of law treatment will be-there will re-
main uncertainty in international commerce regarding prearranged sums
payable on breach. It is imperative then, that at some point in the near
future this work is taken up again and the drafters find some way to make
sufficient concessions so that there can be widespread application.
There has been a steady trend over the decades for the common law
and the civil law to come together towards a consensus on many topics;
one can only hope that on this key issue, there will also be some point
where the systems can come to an agreement. Additionally, in the many
years following this attempt, academics have developed a good amount of
scholarship about the virtues and pitfalls of these clauses and much has
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been written to question the common law's steadfast adherence to its pa-
ternalistic treatment of penalty clauses. 115 One can only hope that the
gradual merger of the legal systems, coupled with the urgings of academic
literature, might one day cause the common law to entertain these types
of agreements. Until that day, uncertainty remains.
ANNEX 1
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
PENAL CLAUSES IN CIVIL LAW
Resolution (78)3 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe on 20 January 1978
The Committee of Ministers
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater
unity between its members, in particular by the adoption of common
rules in the field of law;
Considering that it is necessary to provide for judicial control over pe-
nal clauses in civil law in appropriate cases where the penalty is mani-
festly excessive;
Considering that penal clauses applicable on breach of contract consti-
tute the most typical and frequent form of penal clauses and that it is
therefore desirable to provide common rules for such clauses,
Recommends governments of member states:
1. to take the principles concerning penal clauses in civil law con-
tained in the appendix to this resolution into consideration when
preparing new legislation on this subject;
2. to consider the extent to which the principles set out in the appen-
dix can be applied, subject to any necessary modifications, to other
clauses which have the same aim or effect as penal clauses;
3. to make this resolution and its appendix and the explanatory
memorandum 1 available to the appropriate authorities and other
interested bodies in their countries.
115. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977) (though this article predates the
UNCITRAL draft, it is an important piece on the desirability of enforcing penalty
clauses); Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the cake and eating it too: Efficient Penalty
Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 384
(2002); Larry DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 641 (2001); Ugo Mattei, The Compara-
tive Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427
(1995).
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APPENDIX
ARTICLE 1.
A penal clause is, for the purposes of this resolution, any clause in a con-
tract which provides that if the promisor fails to perform the principal
obligation he shall be bound to pay a sum of money by way of penalty or
compensation.
ARTICLE 2.
The promisee may not obtain concurrently performance of the principal
obligation, as specified in the contract, and payment of the sum stipulated
in the penal clause unless that sum was stipulated for delayed perform-
ance. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be void.
ARTICLE 3.
A penal clause shall not of itself prevent the promisee from obtaining
specific performance of the principal obligation instead of the sum due
under that clause.
ARTICLE 4.
The sum stipulated shall not be due unless the promisor is liable for the
failure to perform the principal obligation.
ARTICLE 5.
The promisee cannot obtain damages in respect of the failure to perform
the principal obligation instead of, or in addition to, the sum stipulated.
ARTICLE 6.
Despite any stipulation to the contrary, the promisee cannot obtain a sum
in excess of either the sum stipulated under the penal clause or the dam-
ages payable for the failure to perform the principal obligation whichever
is the larger.
ARTICLE 7.
The sum stipulated may be reduced by the court when it is manifestly
excessive. In particular, reduction may be made when the principal obli-
gation has been performed in part. The sum may not be reduced below
the damages payable for failure to perform the obligation. Any stipula-
tion contrary to the provisions of this article shall be void.
ARTICLE 8.
The provisions of the preceding articles shall be without prejudice to rules




Uniform Law Relating to Penal Sums
Concluded at the Hague No. 18360
26 November, 1973
ARTICLE 1.
1. The judge may, at the request of one party, sentence the other party
to pay a sum of money, called a penal sum, in the event of failure to
comply with the principal judgment, without prejudice to the right to
damages if grounds therefore exist. A penal sum may not, however,
be imposed where a party has been sentenced to pay a sum of money.
2. The request may be considered even if it is submitted for the first
time in a third-party action or on appeal.
3. The penal sum may not fall due before notification of the judgment
by which it is established.
4. The judge may grant the sentenced party a period of time during
which the penal sum may fall due.
ARTICLE 2.
1. The judge may specify the penal sum as a lump sum, as a fixed sum
per unit of time or as a fixed sum per contravention. In the latter two
cases the judge may also specify an amount above which no further
penal sum may fall due.
ARTICLE 3.
1. The penal sum, once due, shall become fully the property of the party
that requested the sentence. The said party may take legal action for
its recovery by virtue of the title which establishes the penal sum
ARTICLE 4.
1. The judge who has imposed a penal sum may, at the request of the
sentenced party, revoke the sentence, suspend it for a period of time
fixed by him or reduce the penal sum in the event of permanent or
temporary inability of the sentenced party to comply with the princi-
ple sentence.
2. To the extent that the penal sum had fallen due before the inability
occurred, the judge may not revoke the sentence or reduce the penal
sum.
ARTICLE 5.
1. The penal sum may not fall due while the sentenced party is in
bankruptcy.
2. Penal sums due before the declaration of bankruptcy shall not be
counted as liabilities of the bankruptcy.
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ARTICLE 6.
1. Upon the death of the sentenced party, the penal sum set at a fixed
sum per unit of time shall no longer fall due, but the penal sums
which fell due before the death shall continue to be payable. The
penal sum shall become once again payable by the heirs or benefi-
ciaries of the sentenced party only after the judge who imposed the
penal sum so decides. He may change the amount and the
conditions.
2. Other penal sums may, at the request of the heirs and other benefi-
ciaries, be cancelled or reduced by the judge who imposed them, ei-
ther temporarily or permanently and, if necessary, with effect from
the date on which the sentenced party died.
ARTICLE 7.
1. The penal sum shall become void by prescription upon the expiry of
six months from the date of which it fell due.
2. Prescription shall be suspended in the event of bankruptcy or any
other legal impediment to the collection of the penal sum.
3. Prescription shall also be suspended during such time as the party
that requested the sentence cannot reasonably be expected to be
aware that the penal sum has fallen due.
ARTICLE 8.
1. The penal sum shall not be taken into account in determining judicial
competence and the possibility of appeal. 116
116. Benelux Convention, The Hague, Neth., Nov. 26, 1973, Vol. 1162,1-18360, availa-
ble at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60OO1120000/3/2/00004081.pdf.
